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ABSTRACT
Given how central free will and moral responsibility are for theology,
Christian theologians should not remain at the sidelines when
scientists and philosophers debate recent empirical results about
human agency. In this article, the core notion of free will is
identified with the agent’s cognitive ability to exert control over his
or her actions thereby making moral responsibility possible. Then
three scientifically inspired arguments for free will skepticism are
outlined: the argument from eliminativism, the argument from
determinism and the argument from epiphenomenalism. The
remainder of the article explores novel responses to these
arguments and draws some theological implications from them.
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The issue of free will is a core theological topic. It is like an octopus spreading its tentacles
all around systematic theology, touching upon almost all Christian dogmatic loci. Free will
is implicated in doctrines and discussions about God (God’s will), human sin, grace and
salvation as well as our relationship to the created world.1 Due to its centrality, free will has
also proved to be a divisive topic — a source of much debate between Christian denomi-
nations and theological schools.
Recently, free will has also been extensively discussed in the so-called science-and-reli-
gion dialogue. Here, the motivation has, for the most part, been to resist the sceptical con-
clusions about free will that some neuroscientists, geneticists and cognitive scientists draw
from current experimental result. Scientists and philosophers often invoke recent neuros-
cientific and psychological results suggesting that humans exert less control over their
mental life and actions as often assumed. This raises difficult questions about the extent
to which people actually consciously control their behavior.
In this article, I want to identify the kinds of notions of free will that really matter to
theologians and examine some of the scientific challenges posed against them. Given
the fact that there is a significant amount of theologically motivated literature already
out there that discusses various responses to skeptical worries, I will focus on introducing
responses that have received very little attention in the theological literature. I will suggest
that many skeptical worries could be ameliorated, if a move would be made from defend-
ing a dualistic agent causal libertarian views of free will to a more modest set of physica-
listic and pluralistic views. In conclusion, I will point out some of the theological benefits
of these novel solutions, including that they could help make sense of the very common
experience of disunity of the self.
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1. The Will and Its Freedom
It is not at all clear that theologians, philosophers and scientists are talking about the same
thing when they use the term, free will. This is because both words “will” and “free” can
take on multiple meanings. From the point of view of modern psychology, “the will” refers
to multiple distinct cognitive processes. Psychiatrist George Ainslie writes:
… the term “will” gets applied to at least three somewhat independent functions: the
initiation of movement (which corresponds to the Cartesian connection of thought and
action–the function that Ryle found unnecessary), the ownership of actions, which gives
you the sense that they come from your true self (the one that Wegner shows to be a psycho-
logical construction), and the maintenance of resolutions against short-sighted impulses.2
Confusion abounds if we run these three different notions of the will together. I will be
calling the first notion of the will sourcehood. I will return to it later in more detail, but
the basic idea is that the agent or some relevant mental content of the agent, like her
beliefs, intentions and desires, brings about actions. When the agent’s mental content
causes the agent’s actions instead of those actions having their roots outside the agent,
we say that the agent is the source of her actions.
In the second sense, “the will” refers to the experience of being the source of one’s
actions. Ainslie takes this to be a conscious sense of ownership of one’s actions, but I
will call it the source experience. It is not just the experience of initiating an action, but
the process of weaving one’s actions into a larger fabric of one’s self-image or self-
representation.
I want to remind the reader why it is important to keep sourcehood and the sense of
sourcehood distinct. For instance, it is not always the case that actual sourcehood is
accompanied by the appropriate source experience. My beliefs, desires and intentions
can be the source of my action without my having a conscious experience of being the
source of that action. Moreover, some have argued that humans are never the sources
of their own actions but they still often have the appropriate source experience.
Finally, there is the third notion of the “the will,” which is often used to refer to the
mental process of being able to resist impulses and short-term desires. Let us call this will-
power. Willpower has to do with the agent’s ability to set long-term goals and act on them
despite various desires, reasons and other mental states providing conflicting reasons. An
agent with a well-developed willpower is what ancient philosophers considered morally
ideal: an encratic person has achieved self-mastery over her impulses, emotions and confl-
icting desires and is able to act rationally, according to her best reasons.3
Now, we can move forward to the notion of “freedom” of the will. What does it mean
for the will to be free? Let us begin from the role that the freedom of will is supposed to
play in our theological thinking. These roles are many, to be sure, but they all have their
sources in a theological view of human nature. Despite various theological differences con-
cerning divine determinism, free will, grace and other such issues, Christian theologians
maintain that human are, ultimately, created in the image of God. This entails that they
are agents capable of moral responsibility, rationality and moral action. In addition,
humans are also capable — despite their sinfulness — of responding to God’s Word in
some way or another, that is to say, they are spiritual creatures.4 In addition to these con-
siderations arising from theological anthropology, free will also has a significant role in
theological debates about the nature of sin and the responsibility for evil in this world.
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What aboutMoral responsibility? Christian theologians are committed to the view that
humans are morally responsible for their actions in the eyes of God and other humans. So,
the kind of freedom of the will the theologian is interested in must make sense of moral
responsibility. Following this line of reasoning, many contemporary philosophers take
“free will” as picking out a necessary condition for moral responsibility. More specifically,
they attempt identify the conditions under which an agent can be taken as the source of
her actions in such a way as to qualify her for moral responsibility for those actions.5
Without some kind of initiation of action, it seems rather difficult to blame or praise
the agent from acting.
What about Relationship to others and oneself? Theologians maintain that God did not
want to create automatons, or “blocks of wood,” as Martin Luther said. Instead, God
intends humans to be moral agents with some measure of autonomy. This is taken to
be extremely important, because a specific kind of autonomy is a necessary condition
for the kinds of interpersonal relationships, which theologians hold in high regard.
These include the God/human relationship as well as the various human/human relation-
ships. Loving someone, for instance, seems to require a conscious commitment to certain
act/attitude sets towards loved ones. Relationships of love are dependent on the agent’s will
and commitment to long-term flourishing of the beloved. Without those commitments
having their roots in the persons themselves, it is difficult to see how they could be con-
sidered as loving in any robust sense. It seems that love is something that is deeply rooted
in the agent. Free will is also crucial for the agent’s self-relationship in moral and spiritual
matters. Relational moral attitudes, like shame, guilt, repentance and forgiveness are
grounded in free will. Again, if the agent were never the source of her actions, it would
be very difficult to see, how the agent could ever adopt such attitudes towards herself. If
the actions of the agent are not her doing, there seems to be no point in feeling guilty
and asking for forgiveness.
What about the Moral and spiritual life? Free will is also crucial for many theological
accounts of moral and spiritual life. A virtue-based account of moral life makes sense
insofar as a person has some measure of conscious control over her character. In order
to have any kind of virtue at all, an agent must be able to make choices and decisions
between morally relevant courses of action. These actions, in turn, shape the moral char-
acter (beliefs, desires, emotions, attitudes and tendencies) of the agent.6 Similarly, while
theological traditions differ as to the role of the human will in the process of sanctification,
all traditions assume some kind of consciously initiated contribution from the agent in her
spiritual life.
So, the question is this: how might the agent be the appropriate source of her actions so
as to make moral responsibility, interpersonal relationships and moral and spiritual life
possible? Contemporary philosophers often answer this question by insisting that this is
possible, when the actions of the agent are “up to the agent.” This “up-to-usness”
comes down to the agent having a specific relationship to her actions: they are initiated
by the agent and have their roots in the agent, not in some outside factor or a cause.
This is the fact that allows for moral responsibility and moral evaluation. I have so far
been fleshing out the notion of free will that draws inspiration from what contemporary
philosophers call sourcehood-based approaches to moral responsibility and free will.7 On
this view, an action is up to the agent (has its sources in the agent) when the causes that
bring about that action are independent, in some sense, from causes outside the agent. In
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other words, either the agent or those mental states that agent genuinely owns bring about
the agent’s action.
Typically, sourcehood approaches invoke the idea of control over action. If an action is
up to the agent, the agent has relevant control over that action. What might that be?
Various control-based accounts have been offered. John Martin Fischer and others
begin from the ancient notion that action is teleological, namely, it is always directed
towards a specific end. That end provides a reason for why that action is undertaken.
So, to control one’s actions, the agent needs to be able to (a) recognize various reasons
for acting (identify ends of actions) and (b) to be able to generate actions that reasons
guide. Fischer calls this reasons-responsiveness. When an agent exhibits moderate
reasons-responsiveness, we can hold her responsible for her actions.8
Philosopher Robert Kane represents another popular sourcehood-based approach.
According to Kane, ultimate moral responsibility requires not only that the person acts
rationally in response to reasons, but also that the agent herself is responsible for
shaping her own character. An action is up to the agent when the action has its source
in the agent’s character (beliefs, attitudes, intentions) that is freely chosen. In other
words, the agent must be able to shape her character in a way that is not determined
by prior causes. Given this ability, agents become morally responsible for their characters
by shaping themselves over time. They can develop virtues and vices and they can justifi-
ably be blamed or praised for them. Only when the agent, not some external causes, brings
about her character, can the agent be held responsible for it.9
Philosophers have also developed a type of sourcehood approach that does not invoke
action control at all. For the lack of a better term, I will be calling these attributionist
approaches. Instead of invoking action control or choice, the attributionist argues that
the agent can be held morally responsible for those actions that express or represent
the agent’s attitudes and judgments towards others. Sometimes this is expressed in the fol-
lowing way: the agent is morally responsible for those actions that express the agent’s real
or deep self or that represent the quality of will the agent has towards other people. It does
not matter if the agent has control over the actions or the character that produces them. It
is enough that the actions under moral consideration can be attributed to the agent— that
they “flow out of” the character, values and beliefs that the agent identifies as a part of
herself.10
Another way of understanding the relevant control over action is to locate it within the
choices and decisions the agent makes. An action is up to the agent when the agent can
decide or choose to act or not to act. In other words, an action is up to the agent, when
the agent has the ability to do otherwise than she actually did. It is useful to distinguish
this from the various versions of sourcehood introduced above: let us call views that see
the locus of control in the ability to do otherwise as leeway approaches.11 These approaches
are often motivated by our conscious source experience, our everyday phenomenology of
choosing and deciding. It certainly seems to many human agents, that sometimes they
make choices between alternative actions. At these moments, it seems as if there were
alternative futures open to them. The future is like a garden of forking paths unfolding
in front of choosing agents and their choices decide between forking paths. Hence, the
principle of alternative possibilities emerges as a condition for moral responsibility: in
order for the agent to act freely, she must have access to alternative possibilities at the
moment of action.12
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Despite their differences, all these approaches share a common core: there is an “I” or
self that stands in a particular relation to some actions that can be attributed to her. Moral
responsibility and morally significant attitudes require the existence selves that are sus-
tained somewhat consistently over time — selves that exert some measure of control or
choice over their actions and their character.
2. Three Arguments for Free Will Skepticism
Now that we have an idea of the kind of free will the theologian wants and some options in
her disposal, we can examine more carefully the ways in which scientific results could cast
doubt upon human agents actually having such free will. In a recent volume discussing
scientific arguments for free will scepticism philosopher Christian List examines three
arguments against free will that invoke scientific results. All arguments have their roots
in the core notion of free will I discussed above. Free will, as I have suggested, requires
a particular picture of agency and action — that selves (be they non-physical subjects
or just bundles of mental states) stand in a relationship with the actions that they bring
about. The skeptical challenges seek to undermine this picture by arguing that the self
is “bypassed”: either the self is non-existent or irrelevant to the behavior of humans.13
2.1. The Argument from Eliminativism
Perhaps there is no such thing as the self that can play the role of controlling actions. In
philosophy of mind, this view has become known as eliminativism and Patricia Church-
land and others have represented it. The idea is, simply, that mental descriptions (invol-
ving beliefs, desires, etc.) are folk psychological notions that offer very little or nothing in
explaining how the mind really works. Eventually such descriptions will be replaced by
neuroscientific theories and explanations and these explanations will not include anything
like “selves,” “beliefs” or “intentions.”
The eliminativist view is mostly motivated by the continuing advance of the neuro-
sciences: given the fact that the neurosciences produce more and more accurate expla-
nations of the mechanisms underlying everyday cognitive processes, the expectation is
that some day all cognitive processes can be explained without remainder by the neuro-
sciences.14 On this view, humans are physical mechanisms with physical parts, whose
actions can be explained by invoking lower-level physical mechanisms.
A further assumption in the eliminativist position is that mechanistic explanations are
incompatible with folk-psychological, intentional explanations. So, when the neurosciences
progress far enough, folk psychological accounts of human selves and behaviors will simply
become obsolete and become replaced by neuroscientific explanations.
Folk psychological assumptions, like the assumption that we are selves that persist and
initiate actions, will also vanish eventually in this process. We might be creatures with
some experience of selves or source experiences, but these are illusions. If there are no
selves, there can be no free will that performs the role theologians want it to perform.
Among psychologists, this skeptical argument has its roots in a specific notion of scien-
tific explanation and how it related to folk psychology. Psychologist John Bargh has argued
that belief in free will prevents the progress of psychology as a science. Psychology is still in
the grip of folk psychology, because it assumes that there is substantial self or the agent
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that controls or initiates actions. The natural sciences should reject such explanations a
priori: invoking the self as an explanation of behavior is like invoking God as a designer
of organisms in biology. Teleological explanations of folk physics and folk biology have
given away for mechanistic explanations in physical and biological sciences. The same,
according to Bargh, will happen in psychology and folk psychology will give away to
mechanistic explanations. This will be the end of our folk psychological concepts, like
selves, beliefs, and intentions.15
Similarly, psychologist Daniel Wegner argues that belief in the self is a form of magic,
unscientific superstition:
The real causal sequence underlying human behavior involves a massively complicated set of
mechanisms. Everything that psychology studies can come into play to predict and explain
even the most innocuous wink of an eye, not to mention some of the more lengthy and elab-
orate behaviors of which humans are capable. Each of our actions is really the culmination of
an intricate set of physical and mental processes, including psychological mechanisms that
correspond to the traditional concept of will – in that they involve linkages between our
thoughts and our actions. This is the empirical will. However, we do not see this. Instead,
we readily accept the far easier explanation of our behavior that our Houdini-esque minds
present to us: We think we did it.16
Wegner admits that the source experience is very common among humans, but at the
same time, we know that it simply cannot be true. It is analogous to a visual illusion:
we know it to be false but we cannot shake the illusion. Psychological science, however,
can never accept any kind of magical causation, where “selves” and “intentions” cause
actions. Behind our source experience, there can be nothing else than a set of neural mech-
anisms — very complex one’s — that generate our behaviors.17
2.2. The Argument from Determinism
This argument is directed against those views of free will that require the principle of alterna-
tive possibilities (leeway approaches) or ultimate sourcehood, where the agent must have
control over her character such that it is independent from prior causes. There are two
main arguments here. The first appeals to the physical sciences in general: our best physical
science points towards our physical reality being ultimately deterministic. That is to say: that
the next complete state of the universe following the present complete state of the universe is
made necessary by the present state of the universe.
The determinist argument invokes the sciences of the mind in particular. Even if our uni-
verse were not deterministic in this way, it could very well be the case that those psychologi-
cal and neurological systems that make our will and action possible are “near-deterministic,”
namely, work in such a way as to rule out alternative possibilities and ultimate responsibility.
Incidentally, invoking divine determinism, not just physical determinism, can generate this
challenge all the same: if divine determinism is true, there are no human actions that have
prior causes that are outside human control (God’s will).18
2.3. The Argument from Epiphenomenalism
Finally, there is the argument that human selves (be they substances or mental states) do
exist, but they do not stand in the proper kind of role with respect to their actions. In other
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words, crucial mental aspects of ourselves, like our beliefs, intentions and goals, are, in
reality, disconnected from our actions. Instead of selves initiating and controlling
actions, human beings construct their self-representations on the basis of actions that
are initiated with very little input from their self-representations. If this is the case, our
consciously accessible mental states make very little difference in terms of our actions.
The argument from epiphenomenalism is often motivated by experimental results.
First, there is evidence suggesting that our sourcehood and source experience can come
apart. Wegner, in particular, has argued that our source experience is probably mistaken.
In experimental conditions, source experiences can be induced in subjects without the
subjects actually having sourcehood. Similarly, there is evidence that we can initiate
actions without having the accompanying source experience. What Wegner concludes
is that we are never in a position where we actually initiate actions. Instead, their
sources are outside our conscious selves (or mental states we have conscious access to)
and we are never in control of our actions.19
Michael Gazzaniga, a cognitive neuropsychologist, argues that consciousness in general
has very little role in action generation. Conscious selves are constructs of the brain and
they are based on the kinds of actions that the individual performs. But instead of selves
being sources of actions, it is the other way around: actions are generated by non-con-
scious mechanisms and conscious selves are narrative creations that post hoc incorporate
actions into a set of more or less coherent self-representations.20
Wegner and Gazzaniga often invoke the neuroscientific studies of Benjamin Libet. Libet
and others following him have conducted various experiments about the relationship of
conscious initiation of action and brain events. Without going into the details, Libet-
style experiments involve the measuring of brain activity in some way (e.g. EEG, fMRI)
and its timing in relation to the conscious decision to act. The act measured in the exper-
iments is usually something like basic motor movement, like flexing of one’s hand, such as
in the original Libet experiment.21 The standard interpretation of these results is that
before the conscious decision to act, the brain has already prepared in some way for the
decision. What Gazzaniga andWegner conclude from this is that it is the neural activation
that is causing both the action and the conscious decision to act. In other words, uncon-
scious neural causes cause both the initiation of the action (sourcehood) and the accom-
panying source experience. Thus, source experience itself is not really an active link in the
causal chain leading to action.
The evidence that cognitive psychologists have amassed about thoroughgoing automa-
tism in human cognition also impresses many critics of free will. It turns out that many of
human cognitive systems work without conscious control and input. Indeed, their work-
ings are what philosopher Jerry Fodor calls doxastically impenetrable, namely, perma-
nently outside conscious access. In addition, automaticism is also supported by social
psychology, where it has long been acknowledged that the individual’s behavior often
depends on non-conscious social cues. Social psychologists have created a number of inge-
nious experimental settings (like Milgram experiments and the versions of the Stanford
Prison experiment) in order to show the extensive, non-conscious influence of the
social context, especially in the case of moral action. In other words, we are being
influenced by our environment in ways, that are, for the most part, impervious to our con-
scious mind. Because of such findings, debates about conscious action control as well as
automated versus conscious processing rage on.22
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3. Intentional Agents and Self-Governing Systems
It is clear that I am unable in this context to provide a thorough discussion of the sceptical
arguments outlined above. Instead, I will briefly mention some non-standard responses
that have received very little attention in the theological literature.
As far as I see it, theologically motivated responses to the argument from eliminativism
have employed two distinct strategies. The first strategy is to maintain that if physicalism
about persons and naturalism in general is assumed, then the eliminativist conclusion is
indeed correct. But because we know that there are minds and persons, the Christian
should adopt the opposite stance: abandon physicalism about personhood. On this
view, selves are non-physical substances that are not identical with any part of the
person’s body or brain. In addition, selves have a special power — agent causation —
to initiate actions that are guided by reasons. Such a view is required in order to defend
the existence of a very robust sense of sourcehood: the actions of the agent are brought
about directly by the agent (not, for instance, the mental states of the agent). Let us call
this the dualistic strategy.23
The second strategy seeks its answers elsewhere. Warren Brown and Nancey
Murphy, for instance, have argued that mental states associated with selves are
always instantiated by some brain states but they nevertheless have “causal power”
of their own. Because they are emergent properties of our brains, they can have top-
down influence on lower-level processes. As such, we need not assume the existence
of non-physical souls or minds. Instead of a robust agent-causal account of free will,
Murphy and Brown accept something like reasons-responsive theory of moral respon-
sibility: human beings are capable of controlling their actions, since actions are gener-
ated on the basis of reasons.24
In what follows, I will briefly highlight two lines of argument that could be used in con-
junction with the second — physicalist — strategy. Recall, how the eliminativist invokes
the possibility of neuroscientific explanations replacing folk psychological explanations.
The aforementioned philosopher Christian List responds to this by arguing that “ascrip-
tions of intentional agency indispensable for making sense of the social world, in everyday
life and in the social sciences alike.”25 We should adopt the best explanation of human
behavior we possibly can, but in most cases eliminativist explanations simply fail. We
have any idea how neuroscientific explanations could replace folk psychological
explanations.
Folk psychological explanations are used widely in the sciences. Various social sciences,
such as political science and history, and even economics successfully employ folk psy-
chology. The assumption that human beings are intentional agents, act in goal-directed
ways and their behavior can be explained by invoking their beliefs and desires and inten-
tions has a firm place in many scientific disciplines. Neuroscientific explanations, so far,
cannot do the work of folk psychology in the sciences. This does not mean that neuro-
science and cognitive science have nothing to contribute:
… insights in neuroscience are best understood as complementing intentional explanations in
the human and social sciences, not as replacing them. As so, I think, human beings and other
complex animals pass the test of intentional agency. For many explanatory purposes, they are
best understood in intentional terms. Taking an intentional stance towards them is not
merely optional but mandatory.26
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List motivates this claim further by invoking a principle that defenders of critical scien-
tific realism (and critical theological realism) know very well. This is the claim that if a
certain scientific theory works by providing good predictions, for instance, this gives a
reason to take the unobservable factors that the theory postulates as real. When applied
to the issue at hand, the usefulness of folk psychology in both everyday life and various
scientific domains points to the truth of human intentionality: there are indeed mental
states, such as beliefs, intentions and desires and they causally contribute to human
action.
List makes a very important point — a point that many forget in their discussions on
neuroscience and free will. The point is simply that intentional explanations of human
behavior are deeply entrenched in many academic disciplines that produce reliable the-
ories and explanations of human actions. Attempts to remove them or replace them
with neuroscience or even cognitive science have failed (so far). According to List, no neu-
roscientific or any lower-level theory of the mind will replace folk psychology, because
mental properties are multiply realizable, namely, many different physical configurations
of brains and bodies can instantiate the same mental state.27 As a consequence, expla-
nations based on physical descriptions of the brain and intentional explanations of folk
psychology do not do the same work.
List’s argument, if successful, provides us a strong reason to hold onto intentional
agency. Perhaps the theologian might want something more in order to guarantee
moral responsibility and free will — especially a more robust notion of the self. In a
recent book, philosopher Jenann Ismael defends the existence of selves. Ismael is especially
interesting in how various developments in physics and complex systems theories can
make sense of selves as sources of actions.28
Ismael admits that selves are a necessary component of our notions of free will and
moral responsibility. We employ the notion of the self whenever we are required to
make a distinction between voluntary and involuntary actions. Voluntary actions are
those that have their sources in the agent’s self (sourcehood). In order to play this role,
selves must have, according to Ismael, the ability to shape the overall system of which
they are a part, and there must be some level of internal unity or integration to them. If
we take human agents as self-governing systems, these requirements can be met.
Ismael distinguishes between self-organizing systems and self-governing systems. Self-
organizing systems are aggregates of their parts and all behavior that emerges from
them is based on the activity of their parts. Such systems, like a group of fish, have no
central command. Against this, in self-governing systems
there is both an epistemic standpoint that synthesizes the collective knowledge and a system-
wide deliberative standpoint that plays some role in guiding the activity of the system in
which the collective good appears explicitly as a term in the utility calculation.29
Ismael likens such a system to a society that has public institutions and laws or an army
with centralized leadership as opposed to self-organized bands of raiders. Public insti-
tutions and army leadership do not simply hand down orders unilaterally. Instead, they
are there as tools and mechanisms that help to form collective intentions and goals.
Ismael admits that philosophers and others have had the tendency to assume that we
humans are purely self-governed systems, where there was a “central command,” like
reason or consciousness, that simply delivered orders to lower-level systems. Given
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what we know, it is better to see human behavior driven by both self-organization and self-
government. Ismael writes:
We have come to appreciate that there’s a great deal of human behaviour that is the product
of self-organization.… But not all human behaviour is the result of self-organization. Some
of it is the product of the top-down control of self-governance. The details of how self-gov-
ernance is implemented in the brain are not fully understood, but no one… denies that there
is the genuine forging of a collective deliberative standpoint in the human psyche that can
play some role in the determination of behaviour.30
Ismael continues to suggest that human selves could have the same kind of unity than
various kinds of self-governing collectives. From various inputs, like desires, goals and
thoughts, and ways of processing them into a coherent whole arises a certain kind of
unity. We can say that well run companies buy something, armies act intentionally and
nations sign treaties. It makes sense to talk this way even when companies, armies and
nations consist of individuals with mutually incompatible goals and roles. Similarly, the
human self is not a substance or a single mechanism in the brain, but “there is some
one making the choice, some one exercising control, some one making judgments and
undertaking commitments. The someone here is not an individual substance or material
particular lurking inside the system, it is a point of view… .”31 As Ismael admits, the
details of her proposal still need to be ironed out.
4. Deterministic Models and Mysterious Gaps
As a response to the argument from determinism or “near determinism,” the standard
response so far has been what I will call “identifying the gap” — strategy. This attempts
to locate some causal connections either at the lowest physical level (say, quantum
effects) or at the level of the brain that leave room for indeterministic causation. This is
the gap. After the gap is identified, some mental states or other such state associated
with the self are introduced that successfully operate in this gap.
Philosopher John Searle illustrates this strategy very well. According to Searle, humans
have free will, which means that they have the ability initiate their own actions con-
sciously. They can choose to act on the basis on some desires and reasons and reject
others. They can choose, based on rational considerations, inhibit their short-term
desires for some long-term benefit. Without such self-control or self-governance,
human agents could not be held responsible for their actions and characters. In order
for such control to be possible, there must a gap between desires and beliefs on the one
hand, and the action on the other. The gap is where the conscious self operates: it assesses
different reasons for actions, evaluates desires and ultimately decides on which reasons
and desires the agent acts upon. In order for this to be possible, determinism at the
brain level must be false. If “neurodeterminism” were true, there would be no gap for
the conscious self to operate on the brain, and therefore no free will.32
Many critical comments could be made of Searle’s very robust agent-causal account of
free will. There are arguments in the literature, which (convincingly in my mind) demon-
strate that alternative possibilities are not required for moral responsibility.33 In this sense,
moral responsibility might be compatible with the kind of psychological determinism,
where prior mental states of the agent determine the agent’s subsequent action.
However, let us assume, with Searle, that psychological indeterminism is required: in
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order for the action of an agent to be free, that action cannot be necessitated by prior
mental states of the agent. This is often how the agent-causalist understands the situation:
in order for the self to cause actions, those actions must be underdetermined by prior
mental states of the agent. In order for this to be possible, Searle thinks that there must
be indeterminacy at the level of the brain.
I want to briefly mention some proposals that do not have such a requirement. Perhaps
we can have a gap at the psychological level without a gap in the neuronal level. Even if the
underlying neuronal mechanisms operated deterministically, perhaps we can still admit
that psychological causal relationships are indeterministic. There could be enough indeter-
minism at the psychological level to allow for robust alternative possibilities and self-gov-
ernance. One possible way to arrive at this conclusion is to direct attention to how
neuroscientific and cognitive models of the human mind actually work. According to phi-
losopher Steven Horst, we misunderstand these models (indeed, all scientific models), if
we assume that they entail any kind of determinism.
Consider the argument for neurobiological determinism. First, brains are physical
systems. Second, all operations of physical systems are determined by the basic physical
components of those systems. Thus, brains, the source of all our decisions, thoughts
and feelings, are determined by the operations of basic physical components and those
operations are deterministic in nature.
The problem with this argument, according to Horst, is that it involves an idealized
interpretation of neuroscientific models and the laws they posit. In reality, the most plaus-
ible interpretation is that neuroscience provides models that are, to some extent,
abstracted away from what actually happens in the brain. They are, to use Horst’s favorite
metaphor, maps drawn for a certain purpose. As such, they idealize many factors and leave
others out. Neuroscientific laws— no matter how complete they are— have many ceteris
paribus conditions. Thus,
… one can embrace the truth of individual laws, or indeed any set of such laws, without any
implication of determinism, because the idealization conditions of each law are essentially
open-ended.… Likewise, psychological laws, as idealized laws, do not claim to govern all
possible behavior, but only extract a partial list of real invariants in psychodynamics. In
no way are further lawful invariants or voluntary anomic spontaneity excluded.34
Neuroscientific models help the neuroscientist to navigate the world of neurons and
synapses, but we cannot insist that they take into account all possible influences on
brain mechanisms. It follows from this that we can never really infer from actual neuros-
cientific models to the conclusion that brain mechanisms are determined only by the basic
physical components of the system or that the components actually work deterministi-
cally.35 This, in turn, undermines the second premise of the argument for neurobiological
determinism.
If Horst and his pluralism of scientific models are correct, we can preserve the indeter-
minacy of the psychological level. List has more specific ideas as to how this could work
out. His main goal is to preserve the robust ability to act otherwise.36 This requires inde-
terminism at the level of the psychology of the agent, but not (as is commonly assumed)
indeterminism at the level of the brain.
List again invokes the notion multiple realization: one set of psychological states can be
realized by a number of different physical states. If this is true, it follows that we cannot
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infer from physical determinism to the truth of psychological determinism. Psychological
descriptions of the mind do not map onto specific sets of physical descriptions of brain
states.
The coarse-grained nature of the psychological level opens up the possibility that the state of
the world as specified by that level may be consistent with more than one sequence of events,
even if there is physical determinism. In particular, a psychological-level state is consistent
with every sequence of events that is supported by one of its possible physical realizations.
…As long as some of the possible higher-level sequences of events correspond to different
courses of action, it follows that more than one course of action is possible for the agent.
In short, the totality of facts at the psychological level up to a given time may leave more
than one future course of action open for an agent.37
It follows from this that there could be psychological indeterminism without physical
indeterminism. One could make the same point in terms of levels of nature. Some descrip-
tions of nature involve laws and theories that entail determinism: some current interpret-
ations of contemporary physical theory involve determinism, for instance. However, this
does not mean that other levels of description entail determinism.
Finally, List again invokes the idea that deterministic explanations of human behavior
have not worked in higher-level sciences, like social sciences, psychology and economics.
What actually happens in these sciences is that they attempt to explain why people tend to
behave in certain ways rather than others when facing alternative possible actions. They do
not claim that people, in fact, do not choose or decide anything. Non-intentional expla-
nations of human actions involving, for instance, genes, social forces and other general
tendencies, are probabilistic explanations; they do not involve deterministic causation.
Probabilistic explanations explain some general patterns and features of human behavior
without replacing folk-psychological explanation. List claims that, “we would not even know
where to begin if we tried to explain human behavior without assuming that people face
genuine choices, with several options in front of them.”38 Psychological indeterminism is
assumed by rational choice theory in economics and many decision-making theories in cog-
nitive psychology. Given this, the critical realist principle supports indeterminism at the level
of the agent’s psychology: the fact that it is assumed by working scientific theories, we are
prima facie justified in believing that it is indeed the case.
If these replies are successful responses the argument from determinism, it seems that
there is no need to seek for a gap at the brain level, like Searle and many others do. The
brain could operate deterministically but various different psychological descriptions
would nevertheless be compatible with this fact. As a consequence, we look for the gap
at the wrong place, if we focus on neural-level descriptions.
5. Effective Intentions
The argument from epiphenomenalism comes down to the issue ofmental causation. The
question is whether there is causal connection between the agent or her mental states and
her actions so as to make moral responsibility possible. Following the two accounts of
selves I identified above (dualist and physicalist), theologically motivated responses to
the argument have taken two predictable lines of response.
According to the first strategy, in order for selves to play a role in generating actions,
those selves must be non-physical, but also capable of acting on the physical world.
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Without such selves, selves and their mental states would only be a part of an uninter-
rupted and flowing causal network. As such, they could not be free in the way free will
requires: independent from prior causes. Only a robust version of agent causality in con-
junction with dualism will give the required sourcehood needed for ultimate moral
responsibility. Opposed to this, non-reductive physicalists have resisted agent-causality
and substantial selves. They have attempted to provide an account where rational
control of action is possible in a physical world.
A significant amount of literature has emerged in response to the argument from epi-
phenomenalism. The conclusion of the sceptical argument is far from being generally
accepted. The question is the interpretation of the empirical results we have. Many
have challenged the standard interpretation of Libet-style experiments and the whole
project of attempting to identify the exact moment of conscious action initiation. Philoso-
pher Neil Levy, for instance, points out that neuroscientific experiments of the timing of
the source experience only measure a very small set of source experiences — the experi-
ence of initiating an action. When the experience of initiating an action is only found after
some relevant brain event, the sceptic concludes that the action in question was brought
about by factors independent from consciousness.
Levy argues, correctly in my view, that there is no reason to think that a conscious experi-
ence of initiating an action is needed for sourcehood after all.39 Most stereotypical free actions
are such that conscious experiences of initiating those actions are missing. Consciousness
might not even be involved in their initiation at all. Nevertheless, such actions fall under
our intentions, goals and desires, which are consciously accessible, identifiable and regulated
by the agent. Agents can control those intentions at some point in time or another, without
having the source experience of initiating specific actions. As a consequence, Libet-style
experiments fail to show that conscious mental states are disconnected from actions.
Philosopher Alfred Mele has produced most comprehensive critical analyses of Libet-
style experiments available so far. Mele points out that in these experiments the actions of
the subjects are rather simple, motor behaviors, like flexing one’s hand. Mele argues that
such “actions” are quite different from complex moral actions that require significant
deliberation. So, even if it turns out that we lack conscious experience of initiating
simple motor behavior, this says nothing about the role of consciousness in complex
moral decisions.40 New empirical evidence can also be invoked in support of Mele’s argu-
ment. Some experiments show that the readiness potential of the motor cortex tracked in
Libet’s experiments is not even triggered in the context of complex, deliberated decisions.
These results suggest that conscious, deliberative decision might employ different brain
mechanisms than simple motor behavior.41
Regarding the automaticity challenge, there are many psychologists, who see a signifi-
cant role for consciousness in behavior. In a review of empirical evidence, psychologist
Roy Baumeister and others suggest that consciousness plays multiple roles in regulating
actions: it integrates outputs of various, distinct cognitive systems; it makes possible the
agent’s behavior to be influenced by cultural and social input; it is crucial for future plan-
ning and simulation; finally, it is crucial for adjudicating between alternative courses of
action. They conclude, that
The evidence for conscious causation of behavior is profound, extensive, adaptive, multifa-
ceted, and empirically strong. Recent criticisms have questioned the efficacy of conscious
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thought for direct control of behavior. But these criticisms are largely irrelevant to the possi-
bility of offline and indirect effects on later behavior, which constituted the bulk of the
present findings.42
Here they make the point (that Mele and Levy made above) that conscious mental states
can function as regulators of actions even while there is evidence that consciousness does
not often function as the initiator of actions.
Levy has also defended the role of consciousness in action generation. We should not
equate consciousness with the source experience of initiating actions. Automaticity is wide-
spread in human cognition in the sense that actions are seldom initiated by direct conscious
decision to act. However, consciousness has a number of other, vital control functions. With
the help of the Global Workspace theory of consciousness, Levy argues that consciousness
contributes to flexible action generation by broadcasting information across multiple cogni-
tive systems. There is a clear distinction between conscious and non-conscious behavior:
non-conscious behavior might be enough for some circumstances, but eventually it will
be too inflexible. A conscious cognitive system is much more flexible in taking into
account various kinds of circumstances (environment, body, culture, etc.).43 This view of
the role consciousness fits in very well with Ismael’s account of the self I examined briefly
above. It is consciousness that provides the system the ability for self-governance: it inte-
grates information from otherwise distinct system and forms a regulative structure. Further-
more, it matches very well with sourcehood-based reasons-responsive account of moral
responsibility I mentioned. Here, consciousness is the mechanism that provides flexible
access to many kinds of reasons for action.
Finally, there is a significant body of evidence suggesting that conscious decision make a
significant difference to peoples’ behavior in everyday life. In a meta-analysis of almost a
hundred studies, psychologist Peter Gollwitzer and others found that when subjects com-
mitted themselves to various future actions, their behaviors tended to differ from those
who did not make the same kind of commitment.44 So, it seems that what people
decide to do clearly matters for their actions.
6. Epiphenomenalism Again
Let me say a few words about the argument for epiphenomenalism from a philosophical
point of view. Even if empirical evidence will not yield the result of epiphenomenalism,
perhaps a philosophical argument might.
Usually, philosophers invoke the idea of causal closure of the physical world and the
impossibility of mental causation to defend it. Consider the famous causal exclusion argu-
ment for physicalism.45 First, the world is a physical system and it is causally closed (its
events are determined by what happens at the lowest physical level). Second, mental cau-
sation entails that mental states make a causal contribution to actions in a way not deter-
mined by underlying physical states. So, either the world is not causally closed system (and
something like dualism about minds is true) or there is no such thing as mental causation.
Without mental causation, the self or its mental states cannot bring about actions in the
way that free will requires.
List’s discussion of the exclusion argument is rather detailed and I cannot describe it
here. Suffice it to say, that he denies the account of causation and the sufficiency of the
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lowest-level description driving the first premise of the exclusion argument. He offers
three reasons for this. First, it is not at all clear that there even is “a fundamental,
basic” level of physical causation. The physical world we find in the sciences seems to
get smaller and smaller. It is, scientifically speaking, an open question whether a funda-
mental level is ever found. However, if the causal completeness thesis is correct, the
whole notion of causation depends on the existence of a fundamental level. It would be
rather strange if the quite everyday notion of causation were to depend on this scientific
hypothesis.
Furthermore, List argues that even if there were a fundamental physical level of descrip-
tion, there is no guarantee that our notion of causation would make any sense there, as we
can see from a number of discussions on quantum physics. Finally, List invokes the exist-
ence and benefits of all the sciences that study higher-level causal relationships, like social
and behavioral sciences as well as economics. It seems that these sciences at least some-
times manage to answer questions such as: why economic crashes happen, why some
societies thrive and why do some people get Alzheimer’s. If this is the case, they have
identified stable causal connections between various events — connections that are (at
least in practice) impossible to describe in terms of fundamental physical interactions.46
This last point is important for understanding what causation is. List argues, among
many other philosophers, that causal explanations are answers to “what if things had
been different” — questions.47 In other words, when we seek a causal explanation for
an event, we seek an explanation that provides the most relevant difference-making
factor in the situation: “When we engage in causal reasoning, we want to know which
actual or hypothetical interventions in the world would make a difference to which
effects.”48 Now, in order to defend mental causation, we need to defend the claim that
that the mental states of the agent are, at least in some cases, the most significant differ-
ence-making factors with respect to their actions.49 List thinks that this can, in fact, be
demonstrated.
The case of mental causation of human action is analogous to the independence of the
social and behavioral sciences from physics. Social and behavioral sciences have identified
stable difference-making relationships at higher-levels and these relationships cannot be
described or reduced to physical descriptions, because they are multiple realizable. Simi-
larly, human mental states can be shown to be the most significant difference-making
factors in many human behaviors:
It is a person’s intentional mental states that are normally the difference-making causes of the
person’s actions, not the underlying physical states of the brain and body. And this is entirely
compatible with recognizing that mental states are physically realized at the level of the brain.
It is just that realizing brain states do not themselves qualify as difference-making causes of
the resulting action.50
The reason why underlying brain states cannot play the role of difference-making causes is
that, in normal cases of action, they do not clearly map onto a one specific set of mental
states. This is because of the aforementioned multiple realization. By specifying some set of
brain states, we cannot infer to a set of psychological states, or vice versa. It follows from
this, that brain-level descriptions are often too specific to function as explanations of indi-
vidual actions. So, intentional, folk psychological explanations of human action still are, in
many cases, the best way to explain human action. This gives us a good reason to think
THEOLOGY AND SCIENCE 405
that there indeed are causally efficacious intentions and mental states and that the argu-
ment from epiphenomenalism is false.
7. Conclusion
So, the three arguments for free will skepticism — the arguments from eliminativism,
determinism, and epiphenomenalism — are far from conclusive. Free will, even robust
notions of the alternative possibilities conditions, might be salvageable. From the
responses, a certain picture of human willing and agency is beginning to emerge.
I submit that such a picture of free will could, when developed further, play the role that
theologians require free will to play. It could make moral responsibility possible, at least in
the sense of sourcehood and reasons-responsiveness. I see no reason why it would rule out
interpersonal relationship, deep commitments, and development of virtues as well as
internal moral life. The emerging picture has the additional benefit for being more com-
patible with the results of the sciences than a robust dualism combined with agent-
causation.
In order to guarantee action control required for moral responsibility and other theo-
logical goods, there is no need to a posit a non-physical, substantial self that directly causes
actions that underdetermined by prior causes. We can conceive of the self as emerging
from the cognitive processes of the human brain and still have the appropriate kind of
control required for control over action. Moreover, we have suggested that even robust
alternative possibilities conditions could very well be compatible with determinism at
the level of the physical brain.
Finally, the picture would make sense of the extensive empirical evidence about auto-
maticity in human cognitive functioning without undermining the possibility of control.
Indeed, it would realistically highlight how we humans are fragile creatures: our brains,
environments and histories often influence our actions — one could even say that our
actions often depend on causes that are ultimately outside our control. The last point
is, for me, especially attractive, because it could make sense of various well-known
moral and psychological phenomena better than the simplified agent-causal picture.
If we think of our selves as perfectly unified substances without physical parts (like
dualists do), we are left with no explanation of the often-experienced disunity of the
self. Eleonore Stump’s work on suffering and atonement, for instance, highlights the Tho-
mistic idea of sin as internal fragmentation of the will and its relationship to other cogni-
tive faculties. Humans have conflicting desires and their orientation towards their actual
good is hindered by their increasing tendency towards wanting power and pleasure. What
original sin does is that it infects the will with such desires and inclinations. In order to be
unified with God, a human person must have her will healed so as to direct it towards what
is really good and integrated with other intentions and desires. The process of justification
and sanctification is what is supposed to achieve this aim of healing the human cognition
from the effects of sin.51
If the self can be more or less unified, we can make sense of the idea that free will is
something that comes in degrees. The more internally consistent the agent cognitive
capacities are and the more they are directed towards the good the more free her will
and actions are. This is because the more internally integrated the agent’s self is the less
there is conflict and competition between various desires, goals, plans and intentions.
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The struggle for freedom would be somewhat analogous to the struggle for moral virtue
and against moral vice. In this sense, ultimate free will is the goal rather than a starting
point of human development. Ultimate free will is the state where all the internal fragmen-
tation has been overcome and the whole psyche of the human agent is centerd on what is
really good.
Horst’s and List’s pluralistic account of the sciences could also be very useful for theol-
ogy. It is not difficult to see how it could be used to defend the possibility of divine action,
for instance. We would be freed from the compulsion on trying to find gaps at different
levels, especially the fundamental physical level (say, quantum divine action theories),
where we could then place God’s action in the world. The further question is whether
this pluralism could provide tools for divine determinists for defending free will. So far,
divine determinists have constructed their defenses such that there is no need for
robust alternative possibilities at the psychological level. However, the innovation of
List and others might provide an alternative option: does it make sense to say that
while God determines basic physical level events, he does not determine psychological
level event? This is an option that so far has not been examined in detail.
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